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2introduction
This year, we celebrate the 10-year anniversary of the Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and Children (Palermo 
Protocol or Protocol),1 which introduced the concept of the 
“3P” paradigm of prevention, victim protection, and prosecu-
tion efforts to combat modern slavery.2 Anniversaries, including 
this one, afford us a moment to look back, celebrate accom-
plishments, and begin to chart a path forward. In 2001, in this 
publication, I predicted that without strong protection measures, 
the law enforcement efforts that the Protocol mandates for State 
Parties would suffer.3 The conclusion was that the ultimate 
measure of the Palermo Protocol’s impact would therefore 
be determined by the level of victim protections State Parties 
chose to incorporate into their domestic law. While ten years 
may be too soon to judge, 
an interim assessment is 
important to gauge our 
progress and point the 
way forward. This article 
aims to report on the cur-
rent status of protections 
afforded to trafficked 
persons and how they are 
connected to the success 
of prosecution efforts, 
focusing on what appear 
to be the most egregious 
violations of victim pro-
tections — the lack of 
proactive identification, 
victim services, and alter-
natives to detention and 
deportation.
bacKground
The U.S. Department of State’s Office to Monitor and 
Combat Trafficking in Persons leads the U.S. government’s 
diplomatic engagement on the issue of human trafficking. The 
Office is mandated by the U.S. Congress to produce the annual 
Trafficking in Persons Report,4 which is then used as a tool to 
encourage government progress from one year to the next. The 
Report is distinct in that it focuses on trafficking not only as a 
violation of human rights norms, but also as a crime to be con-
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fronted by vigorous law enforcement action, victim protection, 
and prevention efforts.5 The Report places countries’ anti-traf-
ficking efforts in four groupings or tiers from which sanctions 
and other actions can flow.6 Upon the release of each year’s 
Report, the United States works in partnership with governments 
worldwide to develop national action plans, support civil society 
efforts, and generally make advancements in the interwoven 
approaches of prosecution, protection, and prevention.
HuMan traFFicKing in 2010
A decade of actual victims’ accounts has greatly aided our 
understanding of human trafficking. Ten years ago, reports, stud-
ies, and programs focused primarily on women and girls and, to a 
large degree, they still do. Today, however, there is greater recog-
nition that men and boys 
are also found in bond-
age in construction, food 
service, manufacturing, 
agriculture, begging, and 
commercial sex indus-
tries.7 Women are found 
trapped in commercial 
sexual exploitation and 
within various labor sec-
tors including domestic 
work, garment manufac-
turing, and agriculture.8 
Prosecutors, service pro-
viders, and trafficked per-
sons themselves can also 
speak to the fact that the 
year 2000’s depiction of 
victims as naïve, unedu-
cated, duped or kidnapped 
is an unhelpful and offen-
sive stereotype.9 The portrayal of the weak and easily duped 
victim ignores the impulse, necessity, and agency of many who 
seek a better life in the face of difficult circumstances, even at 
the risk of being in harm’s way. The reality today is that people 
seeking and accepting employment are finding themselves in 
coercive situations at the hands of their employers and pimps. 
The outdated focus on international or cross-border trafficking 
is diminishing as well, with more governments recognizing that 
the term “trafficking” as set forth in the Palermo Protocol does 
not connote movement, but is instead a crime of compelled 
service, and that a significant number of trafficking victims 
never travel any distance or cross a border; governments are 
recognizing that their own citizens are trafficking victims within 
their borders. We have also learned that traffickers are adap-
The portrayal of the weak and 
easily duped victim ignores 
the impulse, necessity, and 
agency of many who seek a 
better life in the face of difficult 
circumstances, even at the risk 
of being in harm’s way.
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3tive, responsive and seek out zones of vulnerability that result 
from weak criminal penalties, lax law enforcement, unregulated 
labor recruitment and temporary worker programs, and chang-
ing migration patterns. It is unclear in the ten years since the 
Palermo Protocol whether trafficking itself has changed or 
whether our understanding of the phenomenon has aligned with 
the realities of modern slavery around the world.
victiM protection in tHe context oF tHe protocol’S 
Mandatory proSecution proviSionS
The Palermo Protocol’s most observable result has been 
its rapid adoption by 141 countries as of October 2010.10 The 
achievement of consensus on an agreed upon definition of 
trafficking in persons rooted in exploitation, and the resulting 
criminal laws that countries have adopted to comply with the 
Protocol, cannot be understated. An enacted law, however, is 
only as good as its enforce-
ment. Thousands of traffick-
ers worldwide have been 
brought to justice over the 
decade.11 Yet, the number 
of convictions both annu-
ally and in the aggregate is 
too low to reflect even the 
most conservative estimates 
of the problem. By the U.S. 
Department of State’s calcu-
lation, from 2008 to 2009, 
State Parties collectively 
convicted 4,166 traffickers 
worldwide.12 Many govern-
ments reported just one or 
two convictions. According 
to the United Nations Office 
on Drugs and Crime, 62 
State Parties have never con-
victed a single trafficker.13 
Moreover, just 33514 of the 
4,166 convictions were for 
labor trafficking, despite 
millions of persons known to 
suffer in forced labor around 
the world. As I suggested in 
2001, the Palermo Protocol 
represented an opportunity to improve law enforcement out-
comes both quantitatively and qualitatively by protecting and 
assisting victims. However, in 2010, the most common anti-
trafficking strategy remains enforcement-only, relegating victim 
protection to a secondary role rather than a complementary or 
necessary role. This undercuts not only victim assistance, but 
also hampers the very enforcement mandated by the Protocol. 
Clumsy responses that arrest, detain, or deport victims only 
serve to thwart identification and the opportunity to empower 
victims to testify against their trafficker. Additionally, programs 
that condition services on extensive cooperation or, even worse, 
a successful prosecution have the effect of shifting the burden 
to the victims, placing them in a situation where refusing 
services and going underground becomes an understandable 
response.15
Therefore, State Parties should not dismiss the Protocol’s 
protection measures as discretionary. Instead, they should be 
understood as critical, integral components of the Protocol’s 
mandatory law enforcement requirements that are in keeping 
with the tenets of the modern crime victims’ rights movement 
that has emerged in many countries over the last thirty years. The 
Protocol outlines services that are meant to assist and protect 
trafficked persons. Article 6 requires that State Parties consider 
implementing services for trafficked persons’ physical and psy-
chological recovery, including medical care, housing, mental 
health counseling, job training, legal assistance, and physical 
safety.16 Article 7 requires State Parties to consider providing 
temporary or permanent residence for victims. Article 8 requires 
State Parties to facilitate the repatriation of citizens or nation-
als with due regard for the safety of the victim by providing 
necessary travel documentation and a return without unreason-
able delay.
Taken as a whole, these 
measures, if implemented, 
would constitute a nascent 
international version of 
a crime victim’s bill of 
rights and would guide a 
truly effective law enforce-
ment response to modern 
slavery. These provisions 
recognize that trafficked 
persons require alterna-
tives to systems in which 
repatriation or deportation 
is the default outcome, such 
as services, work authori-
zation, and legal immigra-
tion status. Unfortunately, 
these core protection prin-
ciples are sparsely applied 
by many State Parties and 
are wholly absent in too 
many countries. Victim pro-
tections are not in conflict 
with tough law enforcement. 
Implementation of proactive 
victim identification, funded 
victims services, and alter-
natives to detention and deportation would respect trafficked 
persons’ human rights and yield better prosecution results.
victiM identiFication – not JuSt a laW  
enForceMent reSponSibility
While attempts to estimate the magnitude and scope of human 
trafficking have often failed, adopting even the most conservative 
estimates puts the number of victims worldwide in the millions,17 yet 
governments only identified approximately 50,000 victims world-
wide last year.18 This falls far short of reflecting the scope of the prob-
lem or the population that needs protections. Similarly hidden crimes 
such as sexual assault or domestic violence are vastly underreported 
and it is reasonable to assume comparable underreporting for human 
trafficking, especially as traffickers often convince their victims that 
the police are to be feared rather than thought of as potential rescu-
Programs that condition 
services on extensive 
cooperation or, even worse, 
a successful prosecution 
have the effect of shifting the 
burden to the victims, placing 
them in a situation where 
refusing services and going 
underground becomes an 
understandable response. 
2
Human Rights Brief, Vol. 18, Iss. 1 [2010], Art. 1
http://digitalcommons.wcl.american.edu/hrbrief/vol18/iss1/1
4ers.19 As a result, some governments interpret the disparity between 
estimated and identified victims as a sign that there is not a signifi-
cant trafficking problem in their country. Still others claim that their 
anti-trafficking efforts have been successful in reducing the number 
of identified victims. In both instances, NGOs simultaneously report 
large numbers of escaped victims who do not trust police enough to 
go to them for help. At this point in the modern anti-slavery effort, too 
few cases have been brought in total for a decrease in arrests or con-
victions to stand as an indicator of success. Successful governmental 
interventions should instead be marked by an increase in the number 
of traffickers brought to justice and a similar increase in the number 
of victims protected.
State Parties must use criminal law to vindicate the violation 
of trafficking victims’ most basic human rights. Human traf-
ficking is a crime and governments are being held accountable 
whether in the Trafficking in Persons Report or in international 
tribunals,20 for using criminal law to vindicate the violation of 
the victims’ most basic human rights. However, as stated above, 
criminal law enforcement likely uncovers only a small fraction 
of victims; fear of law enforcement makes them more likely to 
report to other trusted individuals and organizations. Therefore, 
State Parties should support nongovernmental organizations 
to identify trafficked persons in concert with protective law 
enforcement practices. If law enforcement does not demonstrate 
a capacity to treat victims with compassion, there is no incentive 
for NGO service providers to refer their clients to the police.
To improve victim identification, we need to move beyond 
an enforcement-only approach to an interdisciplinary whole-of-
government approach. For example, labor ministries are in the 
position to be detecting a whole range of activities constituting 
labor exploitation, of which compelled service is the extreme 
manifestation. Increased identification could result from targeted, 
proactive enforcement efforts in industries where human traffick-
ing has been found and where populations are most vulnerable, 
typically low wage employment sectors. Other ministries could 
also be involved. To provide further examples, to what extent 
are education ministries working to identify trafficked youth 
recruited within and away from schools? Are health ministries 
training emergency personnel and health care workers to identify 
trafficked persons? Are ministries for women and children screen-
ing for trafficking within sexual assault and domestic violence 
contexts as well as child protection systems? Are immigration 
authorities asking the right questions at the border and in deten-
tion centers? This is the essence of proactive identification – tai-
lored strategies to find trafficked persons based on evidence of 
existing or suspected trafficking. NGOs are replete with examples 
of missed opportunities for victim identification in emergency 
rooms, immigration detention centers, at border entry points, 
and during labor inspections. NGO service providers and victims 
themselves have good information on how victims are identified 
and in whom they trusted to confide in and seek help. This is use-
ful data, in addition to law enforcement characterizations of vic-
tim populations, on which to base proactive identification efforts.
ServiceS, SHelter, and iMMigration StatuS verSuS 
detention and deportation
Despite the Protocol’s promotion of humanitarian treatment, 
which would correspond with status as a crime victim rather 
than a criminal, many State Parties continue to arrest and detain 
trafficked persons. A staggering 104 countries do not have laws 
prohibiting the deportation of trafficked persons.21 Trafficked 
persons are misidentified most frequently as either unauthor-
ized migrants or as criminals who have committed offenses that 
the trafficker forced them to perform, despite the Protocol’s 
policy of non-culpability.22 Even recognized trafficked victims 
are knowingly jailed. This practice manifests in three ways. 
First, they are detained in preparation for deportation. In some 
countries, trafficked persons are detained alongside criminals, 
thereby equating the two and instilling the trafficked person 
with fear, shame, and a false sense of wrongdoing. Second, 
they are detained for a specified period of time during which 
they are required to meet with law enforcement prior to their 
eventual deportation, regardless of any cooperation. In some 
instances, law enforcement takes down a written statement, after 
which the witness is deported. Whether this is a way to hasten 
deportation or a misguided effort to ease the victim’s burden is 
unknown. Such early statements can harm not only the victim, 
but also the prosecution. First accounts are often incomplete 
or inaccurate due to fear and psychological impairments and 
deportation may prevent a victim from being offered services. 
In other instances, a prosecutor may meet with a detained traf-
ficked person for the first time shortly before trial, which does 
not allow enough time for the victim to trust the prosecutor, 
feel invested in the process, or be calmed about confronting 
their trafficker.23 Third, victims are often detained in what the 
government dubs a “shelter” that is nothing but a secure deten-
tion facility.24 They are not permitted to leave and there are no 
services. The time they spend in the facility is considered under 
the country’s laws to be temporary residence during which time 
they should reflect on whether or not to cooperate with law 
enforcement. In these cases, the law masquerades as temporary 
residence, shelter, and return, but the reality is incarceration, 
detention, and deportation.
Ironically, these government practices validate traffickers’ 
threats that law enforcement will arrest, detain, and deport them 
if they escape. In each of these scenarios, trafficked persons 
are devalued, used for the information they can provide, and 
treated as if they are criminals. These harmful practices send a 
message that the government does not care about the trafficked 
person, so why should the trafficked person feel compelled to 
assist the government? Not only is there no incentive for traf-
ficked persons to cooperate, but these measures are punitive and 
re-traumatizing. Adding insult to injury, a response in which 
deportation is the default response means no assessment of dan-
ger upon return, no reintegration, serious risk of the traffickers’ 
retaliation or retrafficking, and potential criminal consequences.
Other State Parties may provide eligibility for limited ser-
vices as outlined by the Protocol, but the burden and responsi-
bility of funding victim services often falls to nongovernmental 
organizations. In countries where there is no civil society to 
speak of, victim services is a largely unmet need. With limited 
budgets, service-providing organizations are either unable to 
meet all of the vast needs of victims whom they assist, or they 
are unable to assist all of the victims that seek their help. Shelter, 
general health care, legal services, and mental health care, in 
particular, are expensive to provide and require financial support 
from State Parties.
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5In some of these countries, even when services are offered, 
victims are not eligible for temporary work authorization. 
Trafficked persons often incur debts to achieve a work opportu-
nity or they have family members relying on their remittances; 
the inability to work and pay down the debt or support the family 
therefore weighs significantly on a trafficked person even when 
services are being offered. For that reason alone, a trafficked 
person may choose not to report the crime or to continue assist-
ing law enforcement. If the house used for collateral is about to 
be repossessed or loan sharks are threatening family members, 
the trafficked person will not want to reflect upon whether to 
assist law enforcement. To ignore this basic economic necessity 
is detrimental to the well-being of the trafficked person as well 
as the investigation and prosecution of the trafficker.
The majority of State Parties condition the provision of ser-
vices on cooperation with law enforcement to varying degrees. 
The Protocol’s protection provisions are silent on this prac-
tice, but overall encourage a compassionate and humanitarian 
response with due regard for the trafficked person’s physical and 
mental recovery. NGOs have long advocated that providing ser-
vices and helping to restore the victim aids in the victim’s ability 
to cooperate with law enforcement and be a more effective vic-
tim-witness. However, few State Parties offer services to victims 
prior to their cooperation with law enforcement; some require 
extensive cooperation or even a successful prosecution before 
making services available. In these instances, the requirement 
of a decision to undertake extensive cooperation, forced upon 
the victim when they are recently liberated and still suffering 
from the physical and psychological ramifications, may serve as 
a disincentive for NGOs to recommend that their clients come 
forward. Where there are no meaningful victim protections or 
opportunities to stabilize the victim before making choices of 
such import, the voluntariness of the victim’s decision is called 
into question. This is yet another example of undercutting victim 
assistance, reducing identification, spoiling the opportunity to 
empower victims to testify against their traffickers, and imped-
ing the enforcement mandated by the Protocol.
concluSion
Human trafficking investigations and prosecutions are tre-
mendously complex. Convictions often depend on the strength 
of victims’ cooperation and their ability to confront their traf-
fickers in court, which means law enforcement must spend 
countless hours working to gain victims’ trust, obtain the full 
account of the crime, and prepare for trial. Who is more likely 
to be an effective victim-witness — the person awaiting deporta-
tion behind bars or the person receiving restorative support ser-
vices? Prosecution and protection are therefore as inextricably 
intertwined in practice as they are in the Protocol.
Without the implementation of the fundamental concept of the 
interdependence between prosecution and protection that is set 
forth in the Palermo Protocol, State Parties will continue to mis-
place their resources and efforts. Adoption of protection measures 
— victim identification through a whole-of-government approach 
and comprehensive services to potential victims along with work 
authorization and legal immigration status — would respect traf-
ficked persons’ human rights and yield better prosecution results.
The promise of the Palermo Protocol was in its recognition 
that we will never prosecute trafficking away. We will never 
identify trafficked persons by waiting for them to come to us. 
We will never have a complete anti-trafficking response with a 
singular approach. In the next ten years, on the occasion of the 
Palermo Protocol’s 20th anniversary, let us hope that we can 
point to a decade in which State Parties did not see victim pro-
tections as a luxury or a nuisance, but as an integral part of the 
interlocking paradigm of prevention, protection and prosecution 
that helps us deliver on the promise of freedom.  HRB
Victim protections are not in conflict with tough 
law enforcement.  Implementation of proactive victim 
identification, funded victims services, and alternatives 
to detention and deportation would respect trafficked 
persons’ human rights and yield better prosecution results.
1 Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons. 
Especially Women and Children, Supplementing
the United Nations Convention Against Transnational Organized 
Crime, U.N. Doc. A/53/383 (2000) [hereinafter Palermo Protocol], 
available at http://www.uncjin.org/Documents/Conventions/dcatoc/
final_documents_2/convention_%20traff_eng.pdf.
2 While this article focuses on the Protocol’s protection provisions 
and their relationship to mandatory prosecution requirements, 
prevention is the third prong of this interdependent approach.
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